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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Defendant Travis Kemp, M.D., a board-certified orthopedic surgeon, was sued 
by the plaintiffs, Jaymie and Paxton Quigley, on a claim for medical malpractice 
related to alleged injuries following a surgery to Mrs. Quigley's ankle. 
During the course of litigation, Plaintiffs disclosed an out-of-state podiatry 
expert to support their claims. Plaintiffs' expert disclosures asserted that their out-
of-state podiatrist consulted with, and relied on, an unidentified Boise-area 
physician assistant to familiarize herself with the local standard of care for board-
certified orthopedic surgeons practicing in Boise, Idaho in August 2012. In an effort 
to ensure that this out-of-state podiatrist met the statutory foundational 
requirements of Idaho Section 6-1012 and 6-1013, Dr. Kemp requested the identity 
of,- and discovery related to, the unidentified local physician assistant. Plaintiffs 
refused and the parties filed cross-motions on the discovery issue. The District 
Court agreed with Plaintiffs, holding that Idaho law protects the identity and any 
discovery of the local physician assistant because Plaintiffs characterized her as a 
non-testifying consulting expert. 
The District Court abused its discretion by upholding Plaintiffs' refusal for 
such discovery because the District Court has prevented Dr. Kemp from discovering 
whether, in fact, the out-of-state expert has the required foundation to testify in this 
case. Dr. Kemp has been deprived the opportunity to ensure that the expert 
requirements of Idaho Code Sections 6-1012 and 6-1013 have been met, and to file a 
motion to dismiss the case in the event they have not been met (which Dr. Kemp 
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never know if the District decision affirmed). As such, the District 
significantly and prejudicially limited Dr. Kemp's ability to defend himself in 
this case, and Dr. Kemp appeals the District Court's ruling. 
B. Course of the Proceedings 
Plaintiffs brought this medical malpractice action against Travis Kemp, 
M,D., a board-certified orthopedic surgeon, Christopher Tobe, M.D., a board-
certified emergency medicine physician, and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical 
Center for its nursing care in the post-operative setting. (Record ("R."), 11-24.) 
On July 24, 2015, Plaintiffs disclosed Aprajita Nakra, D.P.M., an out-of-state 
doctor of podiatric medicine (D.P.M.), as the sole standard of care expert to testify 
as to all Defendants, including Dr. Kemp, Dr. Tobe, and Saint Alphonsus Regional 
Medical Center. (R., 67-68 & 72-73.) The out-of-state podiatrist, purportedly 
seeking to meet the foundational requirements of Idaho Code Sections 6-1012 and 6-
1013 requiring that she familiarize herself with the local standard of care for board-
certified orthopedic surgeons at the time of the at-issue care, consulted with an 
unidentified physician assistant located in Boise. (R., 73-7 4.) The unidentified 
physician assistant claimed to have been practicing in a post-operative setting 
"alongside and in conjunction with" board-certified orthopedic surgeons in Boise in 
August 2012. (R., 72-73.)1 
1 In contrast, the out-of-state podiatrist asserted that she had confirmed with an 
unidentified "board certified emergency room physician" (who, in turn, needed to 
confer with "colleagues") to obtain knowledge of the standard of care applicable to 
board-certified emergency room physicians in Boise in August of 2012. (R., 74.) 
Similarly, the out-of-state podiatrist indicated that she confirmed the local standard 
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August 5, 2015 and August 12, 2015, Dr. Kemp's counsel sent letters to 
Plaintiffs' counsel requesting the identity of the physician assistant relied upon by 
D.P.M. Nakra to familiarize her with the local standard of care pertaining to Dr. 
Kemp. (R. 83, 85.) Plaintiffs' counsel denied the requests on the grounds the local 
practitioner was retained under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(B), and 
therefore the physician assistant's identity constituted "trial preparation material" 
and was not discoverable. (R. 87-88.) After the parties exchanged several letters 
and emails on this issue and were unable to reach a resolution, Dr. Kemp filed a 
motion to compel. (R., 44-45.) 
On September 14, 2015, Dr. Kemp filed a Motion to Compel to obtain the 
na_me of the local physician assistant upon whom D.P.M. Nakra relied. (R. 44-46.) 
Dr. Kemp explained that the identity of the local physician assistant and discovery 
related thereto is necessary to determine whether that individual possesses actual 
knowledge that allows the out-of-state podiatrist in fact to meet the requisite 
foundational requirements of Idaho Code Section 6-1012 and 6-1013 to testify at 
trial. (R., 100-112.) On October 14, 2015, the District Court denied Dr. Kemp's 
Motion to Compel and instead granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Protective Order 
preventing discovery related to the unidentified physician assistant. (R., 125-126.) 
Dr. Kemp sought permissive appeal, which the District Court denied in its 
November 10, 2015 Order. (R., 127-128.) Dr. Kemp then sought permissive appeal 
of care for nurses on a post-operative orthopedic floor in Boise in August, 2012, by 
conferring with a "nurse who practice [sic] in 2012 included working with patients 
on· a post-operative orthopedic setting." (Id.) 
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Court and the motion was granted on December 23, 2015. (See Order 
Granting Motion for Permission to Appeal, filed December 23, 2015.) 
C. Concise Statement of the Facts 
Plaintiffs identified an out-of-state podiatrist, Aprajita Nakra, D.P.M., as the 
soie standard of care expert to testify against each of the defendants, Dr. Kemp 
(orthopedic surgery), Dr. Tobe (emergency medicine) and Saint Alphonsus Regional 
Medical Center (post-operative nurses). (R., 67-68; 73-79.) D.P.M. Nakra is not a 
medical doctor or a nurse, is not board-certified in either orthopedic surgery or 
emergency medicine, and does not practice in Idaho. (Id.) As a podiatrist practicing 
in the Phoenix, Arizona area, D.P.M. Nakra allegedly familiarized herself with the 
various standards of care applicable in this case by talking with various anonymous 
local care providers, including the unidentified physician assistant at issue. (Id. at 
73-75.) 
Plaintiffs maintain D.P.M. Nakra's consultation with the unidentified local 
physician assistant - who purportedly practiced alongside orthopedic surgeons and 
allegedly has actual knowledge of the standard of care applicable to a board-
certified orthopedic surgeon in Boise in August 2012 such as Dr. Kemp - satisfies 
the foundational requirements of Idaho Code Section 6-1012 and 6-1013 to allow 
D.P.M. Nakra to testify at trial. (Id. at 73-74.) Plaintiffs' disclosure states D.P.M. 
Nakra familiarized herself with the standard of care for board-certified orthopedic 
surgeons in Boise in August 2012 by speaking with a physician assistant who 
purportedly practiced in Boise at that time and "whose practice at that time 
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treating alongside and conjunction with board-certified 
orthopedic surgeons during the post-operative period[.]" (R., 
This unidentified physician assistant also purportedly asserted that their 
"practice included making decision [sic] alongside and in conjunction with board-
certified orthopedic surgeons regarding whether a patient's pain was adequately 
controlled for purposes of determine [sic] whether to discharge a patient and/or to 
conduct further inquiry to determine the causes and sources of a patient's 
recalcitrant pain." (Id.) The disclosure went on to state that the standard of care for 
"both physician assistants and orthopedic surgeons in Boise, Idaho in August of 
20°12 are the same standards" that D.P.M. Nakra is familiar with based on her 
podiatry training, and that she adequately familiarized herself with that standard 
through discussions with the unidentified physician assistant and reading Dr. 
Kemp's deposition transcript. (R. 73-74.) Plaintiff's counsel further denied Dr. 
Kemp's multiple requests to name the unidentified physician assistant. (R., 83-
99.) 
As discussed above, Dr. Kemp filed a motion to compel the production of the 
identity of the physician assistant and the District Court denied Dr. Kemp's motion 
and granted Plaintiffs' motion for protective order barring discovery on this issue. 
(R., 44-46, 125-126.) In denying Dr. Kemp's motion, the District Court noted "our 
Idaho Supreme Court seems to be quite conflicted on this issue," and held that the 
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unidentified physician assistant was a non-testifying expert under I.R.C.P. 
26(b )( 4)(B):2 
I think this case is governed by 24(b)(4)(B) -- 26(b)(4)(B). These 
are experts who are not expected as witnesses. They are not fair game, 
they are not subject to deposition and discovery with the exception of 
exceptional circumstances under which is impractical for the party 
seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by 
other means. The facts or opinions are not what is the identity expert if 
they can't find it by other means. The facts or opinions under -- at issue 
are what is the standard of care and did the physicians in this case 
appropriately follow the standard of care. That's certainly facts or 
opinions that are -- the defense, I am sure, has lots of folks ready to 
testify in those regards. 
So I am just going to go with the language of the two rules to 
reconcile them. And I think the best way to reconcile them is to say 
that those local experts consulted in this case are not subject to 
discovery. I will deny the motion to compel, grant the motion for 
protective order. 
(Transcript of September 28, 2015 Hearing ("Tr."), at 11. 27:15-28:12.) 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Dr. Kemp identifies the following issues on appeal: 
1. Did the District Court err by preventing Dr. Kemp from conducting 
discovery to determine whether D.P.M. Nakra has met the requirements of Idaho 
Code Sections 6-1012 and 6-1013 to adequately familiarize herself with the local 
standard of care? 
2. Did the District Court err m determining that I.R.C.P. 26 (b)(4)(B) 
2 "Experts Not Expected as Witnesses. A party may not discover facts known or 
opinions held by an expert who has been retained or specially employed by another 
party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who is not expected to 
be called as a witness at trial, except as provided in Rule 35(b) or except upon a 
showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party 
seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means." 
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disclosure of the identity of the consulting local specialist relied upon by 
D.P.M. Nakra? 
3. Did the District Court Err in make extra-statutory considerations 
favoring the non-disclosure of local specialists? 
4. Did the District Court abuse such discretion in issuing its October 5, 
2015 Order Denying Motion to Compel and Granting Motion for Protective Order 
Under LR.C.P. 26(c)? 
III. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Dr. Kemp only seeks an award of costs pursuant to I.A.R. 40. 
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Idaho law entitles parties in medical malpractice cases to discover the 
identities of the local providers relied on by out-of-state experts to familiarize 
themselves with the applicable local standard of care and qualify as trial witnesses. 
Under Idaho Code §6-1013, a testifying expert in a medical malpractice 
action must meet the foundational requirement of being familiar with the local 
standard of care applicable to the defendant provider at the time of the care at 
issue. Experts that reside or practice elsewhere can familiarize themselves with the 
local standard of care, typically through contacting a local provider to discuss that 
local standard of care. That process, coupled with the local provider's own 
foundational knowledge to provide such information, supplies the expert with her 
legislatively required 'ticket to testify.' 
In this action, the District Court erred in barring discovery regarding the 
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D.P.M. Nakra talked to in an effort to familiarize herself with the 
applicable standard care. The foundational knowledge provided by the local 
provider to D.P.M. Nakra related to Dr. Kemp is precisely the kind of "data or other 
information considered by the witness in forming the opinions" that is expressly 
discoverable 11nder I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(i\.)(i). In particular, ho,x: the unidentified 
provider has knowledge of the standard of care applicable to a board-certified 
orthopedic surgeon practicing in Boise in August 2012 should be discoverable to not 
only test the foundational knowledge of the local specialist (purportedly a physician 
assistant, rather than, e.g., a board-certified orthopedic surgeon or a medical doctor 
of any kind), but also confirm the representations of D.P.M. Nakra. These 
considerations, and the importance of having such ability to impeach and 
potentially strike a testifying expert, are reflected in recent decisions by this Court, 
as.discussed below. 
Further, the rule under which the District Court ultimately barred discovery 
- I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B), regarding non-testifying retained experts - does not preclude 
discovery with respect to local specialists. In addition to being dubiously applied 
(given the lack of proof that such local specialists had been "retained," as required 
by the rule), Rule 26(b)(4)(B) does not bar discovery in this matter even had the 
local specialists been "retained." First, the rule bars discovery as to "facts known 
and opinions held," but not as to identity. Second, as the local specialist's facts and 
opinions were utilized by D.P.M. Nakra in forming her own opinions, those facts 
and opinions have transitioned into discoverable information under Rule 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF - 10 
26(b)(4)(A). Third, "exceptional circumstances" exist in this context so as to allow 
discovery, as there are no alternative sources on the "same subject" - namely, 
D.P.M. Nakra's foundational knowledge that either grants her the 'ticket to testify' 
or not. 
Finally, the District Court's stated concern about a "conspiracy" to ostracize 
members of the Idaho medical community who testify in medical malpractice 
actions is unfounded and overstated. There is no evidence in the record of any 
"conspiracy" or any particular assertion by the local provider at issue in this case 
that she feels threatened in any way by discussing the local standard of care with 
an outside expert. Neither the statutes nor rule at issue provide "fear of being 
ostracized" as any kind of basis for refusing discovery and allowing witnesses to 
remain secret. In situations where a local standard of care cannot be determined 
(even through refusal of local physicians to educate an out-of-state hired expert), 
Idaho allows for alternative means to familiarize those experts with the local 
standard of care - none of which being the use of undiscoverable, secret witnesses. 
For these reasons, as discussed below, the District Court erred in its Order 
Denying Motion to Compel and Granting Motion for Protective Order Under 
LR.C.P. 26(c), which decision should be reversed and the matter remanded to the 
District Court. 
V. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review in this appeal, which addresses a discovery matter, is 
abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Doe v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 159 Idaho 741, 367 
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136, 140-41 (2016)(stating that "[a]s to discovery issues, such as the propriety 
a motion to compel, '[t]he decision of the trial court will only be reversed when 
there has been a clear abuse of discretion.' To determine whether a trial court 
abused its discretion, this Court examines: (1) [W]hether the trial court correctly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) vvhether the trial court acted within the 
outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards 
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court 
reached its decision by an exercise of reason.")(citation omitted). 
A. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred by Preventing Dr. Kemp From Conducting 
Discovery to Determine Whether D.P.M. Nakra Has Met the 
Statutory Requirement of Adequately Familiarizing Herself With the 
Local Standard of Care So She Can Testify In This Case. 
Under Idaho law, Dr. Kemp is entitled to discover the name of, and to 
conduct discovery related to, the unidentified local physician assistant with whom 
D.P.M. Nakra allegedly spoke to in an effort to familiarize herself the standard of 
care applicable to Dr. Kemp. Dr. Kemp is entitled to this discovery so he may 
determine whether D.P.M. Nakra has, in fact, met the statutory requirement to 
adequately familiarize herself with the standard of care related to Dr. Kemp so that 
she has the required foundation to testify in this case against Dr. Kemp. If 
discovery demonstrates that she lacks such foundation, Dr. Kemp may then move to 
dismiss the case for Plaintiffs' failure to meet Idaho Section 6-1012 and thus avoid a 
costly and time consuming trial. 
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With regard experts retained testify a lawsuit, Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26(b)(4) requires that "[a] party must disclose to the other parties by 
interrogatory and/or court order . . . a complete statement of all opinions to be 
expressed and the basis and reasons therefore; the data or other information 
~onsidered bv the witness in forming the opinions .... " (emphasis added). Idaho 
Rule of Evidence 705 further provides that the underlying facts and data of an 
expert's opinion must be disclosed if requested in discovery and that the expert may 
be cross examined regarding the underlying facts or data. 
In this action, D.P.M. Nakra has indicated she relied on "detailed 
discussions" with a local physician assistant for purposes of familiarizing herself 
with the standard of care for an orthopedic surgeon practicing in Boise in August 
2012. (R., 73-74.) As this Court is well aware, in Boise, Idaho, where it is alleged 
that Dr. Kemp failed to meet the applicable standard of health care, such 
allegations must be "affirmatively prove[n] by direct expert testimony" as an 
"essential part" of the Plaintiffs' case-in-chief. LC. §6-1012. That statute goes on to 
provide that "direct expert testimony" must come by way of someone appropriately 
qualified to offer such testimony: 
Such individual providers of health care shall be judged in 
such cases in comparison with similarly trained and qualified 
providers of the same class in the same community, taking into 
account his or her training, experience, and fields of medical 
specialization, if any. If there be no other like provider in the 
community and the standard of practice is therefore indeterminable, 
evidence of such standard in similar Idaho communities at said time 
may be considered. As used in this act, the term "community" refers to 
that geographical area ordinarily served by the licensed general 
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hospital at or nearest to which such care was or allegedly should have 
been provided. 
; see also Mattox v. Life Care Centers of America, Inc., 157 Idaho 468, 473, 336 
P.3d 627, 632 (2014); Ramos v. Dixon, 144 Idaho 32, 35, 156 P.3d 533, 536 (2007). 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs must come forward with an expert who has actual knowledge 
of the standard of care for a board-certified orthopedic surgeon practicing in Boise, 
Id~ho in August 2012. Id.; see also Navo v. Bingham Mem 'l Hosp., No. 42540, 2016 
WL 1638245, at *8 (Idaho Apr. 26, 2016); Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Regional 
Medical Center, 137 Idaho 160, 164, 45 P.3d 816, 820 (2002); LC. § 6-1013. 
Idaho Code § 6-1013 sets forth the standard of care requirement for medical 
malpractice actions and, in particular, the need for at least one "knowledgeable, 
competent" expert witness. That expert is required to have foundational knowledge 
that includes "actual knowledge of the applicable said community standard" that 
their opinion addresses. Id. The statute further provides that an out-of-area expert 
is ·allowed to testify, provided that said expert "adequately familiariz[ed] himself 
with the standards and practices" for the at-issue specialty. Id. While the statute 
and Idaho case law permits the out-of-state expert to familiarize herself with the 
applicable standard of care by consulting with a local provider purportedly familiar 
. 
with the at-issue standard of care, "there must be evidence showing that the Idaho 
[provider] knows the applicable standard of care." See Ramos v. Dixon, 144 Idaho at 
37 (emphasis added)(quoting Dulaney); accord, Navo v. Bingham Mem 'l Hosp., 2016 
WL 1638245, at *8; Arregui v. Gallegos-1l1ain, 153 Idaho 801, 809, 291 P.3d 1000, 
1008 (2012). Without satisfying these foundational hurdles, an out-of-state expert 
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offer expert testimony and the plaintiffs case cannot pursued. 
If Dr. Kemp is prevented from discovering the identify of, and discovery 
related to, the unidentified local provider D.P.M. Nakra allegedly relied on to gain 
the necessary foundation to testify in Idaho against him, he will be significantly 
prejudiced because, contrary to Idaho law, he will be precluded from discovering 
whether the necessary "evidence" exists that proves whether the local physician 
assistant with whom D.P.M. Nakra consulted in fact knows the applicable standard 
of care. He is then unjustifiably barred from challenging whether D.P.M. Nakra 
has in fact met the statutory foundational requirements to offer standard of care 
opinions at trial. See, generally, Navo v. Bingham Mem 'l Hosp., No. 42540, 2016 
WL 1638245, at *IO; Arregui v. Gallegos-Main, 153 Idaho 801, 806, 291 P.3d 1000, 
1005 (2012); Ramos v. Dixon, 144 Idaho at 38, 156 P.3d at 539; Dulaney v. St. 
Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho at 169, 45 P.3d at 825. 
Idaho law does not permit Plaintiffs to shield the foundational basis for 
D.P.M. Nakra's opinions that the Idaho legislature has required. Dr. Kemp is 
entitled to discovery regarding the local provider's actual knowledge of the 
applicable standard of care given that D.P.M. Nakra is relying on her to obtain her 
'ticket to testify.' Such foundational questioning includes: 
(I) whether the anonymous provider agrees she has actual knowledge of 
the applicable standard of care; 
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(2) how the anonymous provider has knowledge of the applicable standard 
of care; 
(3) whether the local practitioner was in fact contacted by the out-of-state 
expert; and 
(4) the contents of the discussion, including ·whether the conversation ·was 
specific as to an orthopedic surgeon practicing in Boise, Idaho in August 2012. 
Each of these questions is critical to examining and verifying the required 
foundation Plaintiffs must lay in order for D.P.M. Nakra to testify in this action. Dr. 
Kemp is not required to simply take Plaintiffs' or D.P.M. Nakra's word on these key 
issues that will determine whether Plaintiffs have met the statutory foundational 
requirements for D.P.M. Nakra to testify in this Idaho action against Dr. Kemp. 
Further, each of the above issues contains numerous subsets of questions 
th:;it Dr. Kemp is entitled to ask to test and challenge D.P.M. Nakra's foundation 
and credibility, and which are relevant to the ultimate admissibility and reliability 
of D.P.M. Nakra's testimony. Specifically, with regard to how the anonymous 
provider has knowledge of the standard of care applicable to a board-certified 
orthopedic surgeon practicing in Boise in August 2012: 
• what experience, if any, the physician assistant has working with and 
alongside board-certified orthopedic physicians in Boise, Idaho in 
August 2012; 
• what experience, if any, the physician assistant has with regard to 
splinting patients following ankle surgeries such as the surgery 
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performed in this case in Boise, Idaho in August 2012; 
• what experience, if any, the physician assistant has with regard to 
pain control management of patients following these types of ankle 
surgeries in Boise, Idaho in August 2012; 
• vvhat experience, if any, the physician assistant has with regard to 
working and interacting with nurses following post-ankle surgery 
patients in Boise, Idaho in August 2012; and 
• what experience, if any, the physician assistant has discharging 
patients following these types of ankle surgeries in Boise, Idaho in 
August 2012. 
To prevent Dr. Kemp from discovering basic foundational information as to 
whether D.P.M. Nakra has the necessary foundation to testify, Plaintiffs rely on 
Bybee v. Gorman, 157 Idaho 169, 179, 335 P.3d 14, 24 (2014). In Bybee, the 
Supreme Court of Idaho held that the failure to name the local consulting physician 
used to familiarize the out-of-state expert was not fatal to the admissibility of an 
affidavit in opposition to a motion for summary judgment from the out-of-state 
physician. 157 Idaho at 179. Specifically, the Bybee court noted that "[a]ccepting 
th~ truth of this affidavit, the unidentified physician practiced in the relevant 
community at the same time as the events that gave rise to this action and in the 
same specialty as Dr. Gorman." Id. As such, the court denied summary judgment. 
Id. 
Of key importance, however, and what distinguishes the Bybee decision from 
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the procedural status of Bybee versus this case. Bybee was decided in 
of summary judgment where the district court is required to accept the 
truth of the allegations in the affidavit filed by the non-moving party. Id. With 
respect to the procedural status of this case, the parties are in a discovery dispute 
as to ·whether Dr. Kemp is entitled to the name of, and discovery related to, the local 
provider D.P.M. Nakra allegedly spoke to in an effort to familiarize herself with the 
standard of care applicable to Dr. Kemp. 
As such, whether the failure to identify the local specialist is fatal to 
admissibility of a summary judgment affidavit is an entirely different question from 
the questions in this case: whether a party may shield the identity of discovery 
related to the local specialist with whom the out-of-state expert purports to have 
gained the required foundational knowledge of the applicable standard of care so as 
to obtain her 'ticket to testify' in this case. Such distinction was recognized in a 
footnote in the Bybee decision: 
The corollary of this holding is that defendant should be 
permitted to conduct discovery as to the identity of consulting 
physicians. As in Dunlap, an expert's claim to have consulted with a 
local practitioner in order to gain familiarity with the applicable 
standard of health care practice may present questions of 
credibility for consideration by the ultimate trier of fact. 
(Id., n. 8)(emphases added). 
In recognizing this need of an opposing party to evaluate the sufficiency of 
the local standard of care familiarization process as part of its defense of a case, the 
Bybee court referenced the Dunlap case. In Dunlap v. Garner, 127 Idaho 599, 603, 
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903 P.2d 1296, 1300 (1994), the plaintiffs expert submitted an affidavit indicating 
he- had familiarized himself with the local standard of care by discussing the case 
with two local physicians. However, the defendant submitted affidavits from those 
same physicians indicating they had not, or at least could not recall, discussing local 
standard of care v:ith the plaintiffs expert witness. Id. Dunlap exemplifies why 
this type of discovery is so critical. What if the local provider D.P.M. Nakra 
allegedly spoke to denies such a conversation took place, or denies having 
knowledge of the standard of care for an orthopedic surgeon in August 2012, or 
denies the specifics of the conversation? This would raise issues as to the 
. 
admissibility and credibility of D.P.M. Nakra's testimony and ultimately whether 
Plaintiffs could continue to pursue this action against Dr. Kemp. 
Similar issues were raised in the lead decision of Arregui v. Gallegos-Main, 
153 Idaho 801, 291 P.3d 1000 (2012). In Arregui, a plaintiff in a medical 
malpractice action offered the affidavit testimony of a proposed expert. With 
respect to that expert's familiarization with the local standard of care, the expert 
testified that she had familiarized herself by speaking with an unidentified "local 
chiropractor," and that it was her "understanding" that the unidentified 
chiropractor was licensed and maintained an active practice. Id. at 809. The expert 
also contended that the unidentified chiropractor indicated that he was familiar 
with the local standard of care and confirmed that it was identical to the out-of-
Stc!-te standard of care the expert herself was familiar with. Id. Given these bare 
contentions, the lead opinion of the Arregui Court found the anonymity of the local 
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failed establish the necessary foundation to allow for the expert's 
Rather, in a medical malpractice case, it must be shown that the 
expert possesses sufficient knowledge of the specific procedures used 
by the defendant physician as the alleged malpractice. Here, the 
Patient merely asked the district court to believe Dr. Tamai's 
conclusory statements that the local unidentified chiropractor 
was familiar with the standard of care and because Dr. Tamai 
spoke with him, she was also now familiar with the local 
standard of care. Such meager information is insufficient. 
Arregui v. Gallegos-Main, 153 Idaho at 809 (citations omitted) (emphases added). 
While the concurring opinion expressed reservation about the lead opinion on this 
question, 3 these reservations have apparently been resolved, as reflected in this 
Court's recent unanimous decision in Navo v. Bingham Memorial Hosp., 2016 WL 
1638245 (Idaho Apr. 26, 2016). 
In Navo, this Court affirmed the granting of summary judgment in favor of 
defendants in a medical malpractice action where, in part, the plaintiffs "failed to 
provide evidence that he was familiar with the relevant local standard of care[.]" 
Id. at *1. That expert attested that his knowledge of the local standard of care (for 
3 "One example is the suggestion that the identity of the local health care provider 
with whom a Plaintiffs expert consults must be disclosed as part of the foundation 
for that opinion. As a former trial court judge, I was called upon to resolve several 
discovery disputes in which defense counsel sought to learn the identity of the 
individuals consulted by Plaintiffs' experts in the course of familiarizing themselves 
with the applicable standard of health care practice. In the course of those 
proceedings, it was clear that there is a fundamental disagreement among district 
judges as to whether this information must be disclosed. Although not necessary to 
resolution of this appeal, the majority appears to decide this question in a fashion 
w4ich will be welcomed by the insurance defense bar and medical community." 
Arregui v. Gallegos-Main, 153 Idaho at 811, n.2 (J. Horton, concurring). 
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Blackfoot) was based upon Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals 
standards, as well as speaking with the Associate Director of the Idaho State Board 
of Nursing (Judith Nagel). Id. at *3. This Court explained the requirements for 
familiarization with the local standard of care via use of a local specialist, 
emnhasizirnr the need to confirm "the local sner.iafo:~t intP.rviAwAcl has ::i~tua l 
,A, ...., 
- - - --- -.L- - -- ----- -----. -- •• -~- --~- ~-- ----
knowledge of the applicable standard of care." Navo v. Bingham Mem 'l Hosp., 2016 
WL 1638245, at *8. This Court summarized that an expert who failed to 
demonstrate the appropriate foundational basis was properly excluded where the 
out-of-state expert consulted with a local provider and failed to identify the local 
provider, failed to describe the local provider's practice, and failed to explain how 
the out-of-state expert became familiar with the local standard of care. Id. As such, 
the Court affirmed the striking of plaintiffs' expert finding that: 
[W]e hold that the district court was correct in finding that in and of 
itself, Dr. Steinberg's conversation with Judith Nagel was not 
sufficient to give him actual knowledge of the local standard of care in 
Blackfoot in December of 2008. In order for Judith Nagel to have 
familiarized Dr. Steinberg with the standard of care, she would have 
had to herself been familiar with that standard of care. Appellants fail 
to produce any evidence that Judith Nagel was familiar with the local 
standard of care in Blackfoot in December of 2008. 
Navo v. Bingham Mem 'l Hosp., 2016 WL 1638245, at *IO. Importantly, per an 
earlier footnote in the decision, because the identity of the local specialist (Ms. 
Nagel) was known, an affidavit from the local specialist was submitted by the 
defendant with the motion to strike, which disavowed the contention of plaintiffs' 
expert: 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF - 21 
In conjunction with its motion to strike, BMH submitted the affidavit 
of Judith Nagel; stating that: 
I do not recall making any statements to Dr. Steinberg about 
community standards for nurse anesthetists or for hospitals 
either in Idaho or other states. Furthermore, I do not have 
actual knowledge of the local community standard of health 
care practice that applied to BMH or nurse anesthetists in 
Blackfoot, Idaho, in December 2008. 
Navo u. Bingham Mem 'l Hosp., 2016 WL 1638245, at *15. 
Here, however, keeping the local specialist secret and undiscoverable 
precludes Dr. Kemp from ever having the opportunity to secure such 'silver bullet' 
testimony that might wholly undercut and impeach the testimony of D.P.M. Nakra. 
This is especially critical where D.P.M. Nakra and the local physician assistant are 
not board-certified orthopedic surgeons. See, e.g., Suhadolnik u. Pressman, 151 
Idaho 110, 116, 254 P.3d 11, 17 (2011)(stating that "when consulting with a local 
specialist, that specialist need not have practiced in the same field as the defendant, 
so long as the consulting specialist is sufficiently familiar with the defendant's 
specialty."). In addition, here, the familiarizing expert does not hold a medical 
doctorate in any specialty, which calls into question whether the familiarizing local 
'expert' is a provider "of the same class" as Dr. Kemp, as per LC. §6-1012. 
Based on the above, pursuant to Idaho law, Dr. Kemp should not be denied 
the opportunity to obtain the identify of, and discovery related to, the local 
physician assistant D.P.M. Nakra allegedly talked to in an effort to meet the 
statutory foundational requirements the legislature has imposed on out-of-state 
experts such as D.P.M. Nakra. Such discovery could prove critical in impeaching or 
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even striking D .P .M. expert testimony the District Court should not 
prevented Dr. Kemp from such opportunity. 
B.- I.R.C.P. 26 (b)(4)(B) Does Not Preclude Disclosure of the Identity of the 
Consulting Local Specialist Relied Upon by D.P.M. Nakra. 
In denying Dr. Kemp's motion to compel, the District Court held that 
discovery of the local physician assistant D.P.M. Nakra consulted was precluded by 
Rt~le 26(b)(4)(B) because, per that Rule, the local consultant was not expected to be 
a witness in the case. (Tr. 27:15-28:12.) The District Court made such ruling even 
though none of the cases regarding local specialists in the context of medical 
malpractice actions discuss precluding discovery of local specialists based upon that 
rule. 4 In addition to this lack of Idaho law supporting such a contention, the 
District Court's reliance on I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B) is in error for other reasons. 
First, I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B) only applies to experts who have been "retained or 
specially employed." Here, as noted at the hearing before the District Court, there 
is -no proof in the record establishing that the local specialists were actually 
"retained" or "specially employed," beyond the bare allegations of the Plaintiffs' 
counsel. (Tr. 16:16-17:10.) Absent such a minimum showing, I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B) is 
of no application, and the District Court erred in failing to require such a showing 
and in applying I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B). 
4 Indeed, the only case appearing to discuss I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B) in any substantive 
fashion is White v. Mock, 140 Idaho 882, 104 P.3d 356 (2004), which only made some 
discussion of the rule as guiding the answer to the question of whether a party can 
call another party's expert as a testifying witness at trial. Id. at 889 ("In that the 
rules do not allow for depositions of a party's expert who is not expected to be called 
as- a witness at trial, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B), it follows that that expert 
cannot be called by the opposing party during trial unless a proper showing of 
exceptional circumstances is made.") 
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Further, even were Plaintiffs to have demonstrated that the local speciaiists 
were "retained," the District Court erred in barring all discovery relating to such 
local specialists. Notably, I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B)'s limitation on discovery is limited to 
"facts known or opinions held" - not identity. Federal courts, under the Federal 
Rules' analogue for non-testiftJing experts, have held that identification of such 
consultants is discoverable. See generally, Manzo v. Stanley Black & Decker Inc., 
2015 WL 136011, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2015)("Although the case law is not 
entirely uniform, the majority of courts hold that the identities of non-testifying 
experts, as opposed the 'facts known or opinions held' by such experts, is governed 
by Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(l), providing for discovery of the 'identity and location of 
persons who know of any discoverable matter,' as opposed to (b)(4)(B), now (b)(4)(D). 
As a result, identity information is discoverable without a showing of 'exceptional 
circumstances."') The District Court's voiced concern that even revealing the 
identities of the local specialists would "subject themselves to a certain amount of 
ostracism or disfavor" within the medical community provides no basis to bar 
discovery under I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B) according to the language of that rule. 
Additionally, the reliance by D.P.M. Nakra upon the information provided by 
the local specialists (even if deemed 'retained') would otherwise shift any protected 
'facts and opinions' of the local specialists from I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B) and into the 
discoverable realm of I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(l)(i), which allows discovery of "the data or 
other information considered by the witness in forming the opinions[.]" See, e.g., 
Heitmann v. Concrete Pipe Mach., 98 F.R.D. 740, 742 (E.D. Mo. 1983). 
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In addition, even had Plaintiffs demonstrated that the local physician 
assistant was "retained," the District Court erred in refusing to find that there were 
"exceptional circumstances" allowing discovery of the local specialists, per I.R.C.P. 
26(b)(4)(B). As above, the District Court rationalized the denial by holding that: 
The facts or opinions are not what is the identity expert if they can't 
find it by other means. The facts or opinions under -- at issue are what 
is the standard of care and did the physicians in this case 
appropriately follow the standard of care. That's certainly facts or 
opinions that are -- the defense, I am sure, has lots of folks ready to 
testify in those regards. 
(Tr. 27:22-28:5). More simply stated, the District Court held that because it 
believed Defendants had access to their own standard of care experts, Defendants 
had not shown that "it was it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery 
to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means." I.R.C.P. 
26.(b)(4)(B). In doing so, however, the District Court errantly assumed that the 
"same subject" simply included the question of standard of care. More correctly, the 
"same subject" is actually the foundational know ledge of the testifying expert, as is 
expressly discoverable in Rule 26(b)(4) (allowing discovery of, in part, "the data or 
other information considered by the witness in forming the opinions"). 
Absent discovery regarding D.P.M. Nakra's foundational knowledge, Dr. 
Kemp has no other means to obtain discovery regarding the bulleted points set forth 
above. The fact that Dr. Kemp is himself aware of the applicable standard of care is 
irrelevant to the question of D.P.M. Nakra's foundational knowledge, and it does 
not provide him any knowledge as to how the anonymous physician assistant has 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF · 25 
knowledge, where she obtained it from, or whether and how it was conveyed to 
Nakra. 
For these reasons, the District Court erred in finding that I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B) 
barred discovery of local specialists, and in particular, the physician assistant that 
D.P.lVL Nakra relied upon to form her standard of care opinions. 
C.. The District Court Erred in Making Extra-Statutory Considerations 
Favoring Non-Disclosure of Local Specialists. 
At hearing, the District Court expressed concern of revealing the identity of 
the local physician assistant D.P.M. Nakra consulted with by suggesting there is a 
"conspiracy" and explaining from his experience as a private practitioner that it is 
"extremely difficult" to find a local expert. (Tr. 25:18-26:15.) Setting aside the 
patent lack of any evidence regarding any "conspiracy" (which the District Court 
ultimately concedes), nothing in LC. §6-1013 (or I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B), for that 
matter) contemplates barring discovery regarding a local specialist on the 
unsupported grounds that they might receive a "certain amount of ostracism or 
disfavor." 
Indeed, where the Idaho Legislature has determined that confidentiality of a 
medical witness is appropriate, it has provided for such. In medical indigency 
matters, the identity of medical reviewers who provide utilization management 
reviews is confidential: 
31-3558. NONDISCLOSURE OF PERSONAL IDENTIFYING 
INFORMATION. Personal identifying information about a particular 
utilization management reviewer or practitioner engaged by the 
department or the board shall not be disclosed without the prior 
written authorization of the reviewer or practitioner. Notwithstanding 
this nondisclosure of personal identifying information, redacted copies 
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of all reports and recommendations of the department's or the board1s 
utilization management reviewers or practitioners shall be maintained 
in the official record of the respective county commissioners and the 
board as described in chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code, and chapter 15, 
title 31, Idaho Code. 
LC. §31-3558.5 
revealing the identity and information of a local provider under LC. §6-1013. 
Similarly, no portion of Rule 26(b)(4)(B) makes a fear of a "certain amount of 
ostracism or disfavor" a consideration in whether to allow discovery of a non-
testifying expert who voluntarily chooses to provide information to a testifying 
expert and provide that expert with the foundational knowledge necessary to 
testify. 
Moreover, concerns about the fears of local providers - translating to the 
potential inability of a testifying expert to familiarize themselves with the local 
standard of care - are addressed through other options. As recently explained by 
this Court, when a local standard of care is deemed "indeterminable" despite 
concerted efforts to make such a determination (including the scenario where local 
physicians refuse to respond), the common law principle of "similar localities" will 
step in. Lepper v. E. Idaho Health Servs., Inc., No. 42004, 2016 WL 852423, at *12 
(Idaho Mar. 4, 2016), reh'g denied (Apr. 15, 2016). By analogy, even if the plaintiffs 
local consulting provider is faced with some broad 'conspiracy of silence' in the 
medical community in Idaho, this Court has appropriately recognized there is an 
5 The question of whether this medical indigency statute actually comports with due 
process protections is a question for another day and another case. 
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means to address that and still secure the necessary foundational 
knowledge. 
Accordingly, the District Court's denial of Dr. Kemp's Motion to Compel (and 
related granting of the Motion for Protective Order in the Plaintiffs' favor), to the 
exient based upon such extra-statutory concerns, is in error and should be reversed. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The District Court abused its discretion when it prevented Dr. Kemp from 
obtaining the name of, and conducting discovery related to, whether the local 
physician assistant that Plaintiffs' out-of-state expert allegedly spoke to in an effort 
to meet the statutory foundational requirements of Idaho Code Sections 6-1012 and 
6-1013 was, in fact, adequately familiar with the standard of care applicable to Dr. 
Kemp. By preventing such discovery, Dr. Kemp is not able to determine whether in 
fact the out-of-state expert has the required foundation to testify in this case and, 
therefore, has been deprived the opportunity to ensure that the mandates of Idaho 
Code Section 6-1012 and 6-1013 have been met. As such, the District Court 
significantly and prejudicially limited Dr. Kemp's ability to defend himself in this 
case because the District Court stripped Dr. Kemp of any chance to move to dismiss 
this case for Plaintiffs' failure to meet the requirements of Idaho Section 6-1012 and 
6-1012, and potentially avoid a costly and time consuming trial. 
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Based on the above, Dr. Kemp respectfully requests that the October 5, 2015 
Order Denying Motion to Compel and Granting Motion for Protective Order Under 
I.R.C.P. 26(c) be reversed and remanded to the District Court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ;J.. "}1'!: day of May, 2016. 
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